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Abstract
Objective: Major depressive disorder (MDD) has been characterized by abnormalities in emotional processing. However,
what remains unclear is whether MDD also shows deficits in the unconscious processing of either positive or negative
emotions. We conducted a psychological study in healthy and MDD subjects to investigate unconscious emotion
processing and its valence-specific alterations in MDD patients.
Methods: We combined a well established paradigm for unconscious visual processing, the continuous flash suppression,
with positive and negative emotional valences to detect the attentional preference evoked by the invisible emotional facial
expressions.
Results: Healthy subjects showed an attentional bias for negative emotions in the unconscious condition while this valence
bias remained absent in MDD patients. In contrast, this attentional bias diminished in the conscious condition for both
healthy subjects and MDD.
Conclusion: Our findings demonstrate for the first time valence-specific deficits specifically in the unconscious processing of
emotions in MDD; this may have major implications for subsequent neurobiological investigations as well as for clinical
diagnosis and therapy.
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Introduction
Emotion processing operates on a conscious level as well as in an
unconscious (e.g., implicit and automatic) mode, with both being
associated with different neurobiological pathways [1–3]. A large
body of literature has focused on the conscious aspect of emotion
processing as for instancein studies on emotional-cognitive regulation
and its abnormalities (e.g., [4–5]). In contrast, the unconscious aspect
has been considered as the perception and earlier processing of the
emotion that precedes their cognitive regulation [6]. What remains
unclear though is whether especially these different steps in emotion
processing, i.e., early (unconscious) and late (conscious), are valence-
specific and thus different for positive and negative emotions in
healthy subjects (for reviews, see [7]).
The situation is even more complicated in patients with major
depressive disorder (MDD) who suffer from an abnormal imbalance
between positive and negative emotions (see [8] for a recent review).
MDD can be characterized by deficits in conscious emotion
processing as it is, for instance, required in regulation of especially
negative emotions (see [4] for a review). In contrast, the findings in
unconscious emotion processing are rather inconsistent. Some
studies reported deficits in unconscious emotional processing in
MDD[9–11] whereasothersfailed tofindanychangesinMDD[5].
For example, Mogg et al. [12] applied a Stroop task with emotional
stimuli that were backward masked and thus unconsciously
presented; MDD patients did not show any abnormalities in this
task (see also [13–14]). Similarly, several studies could not observe
an attention bias with masked emotional stimuli in depressed
participants either [15–16]. A neuroimaging study [17] did not find
any difference in right amygdala in response to backward-masked
emotional faces between MDD patients and control subjects. In
contrast, more recent analogous imaging studies did report deficits
in the amygdala activity during masked faces [9–11]. Taken
together, recent findings on unconscious emotional processing are
inconsistentwith regardtotheunconsciousdeficitsinMDDpatients
and it also remains unclear whether they are valence-specific.
Due to the fact that the commonly applied technique of
backward masking yielded rather mixed results in unconscious
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approach, continuous flashing interocular suppression (CFS) [18–
20]. The CFS has been successfully and reliably used to tap into
the implicit and automatic processing in the visual domain [21–
22]. Compared to the backward-masking technique, the CFS can
present information unconsciously throughout a relatively long
viewing period (sometimes longer than 3 mins), potentially
allowing for more robust and reliable unconscious processing
[23]. In order to investigate the unconscious processing in the
emotional domain, we combined the CFS with emotional faces of
positive and negative valences. Using this paradigm, we conducted
two experiments in healthy subjects using different stimulus
durations (200 ms, 800 ms) of the viewing period (Experiments 1
and 2). This served as the basis for a third experiment (Experiment
3) where we directly compared healthy and MDD subjects in the
emotional CFS to explore the valence-specific deficits in
unconscious emotional processing in MDD.
Methods
Participants
All participants were recruited at Shanghai Mental Health
Center. After a complete description of the study, written informed
consent was obtained from each participant. The protocol of this
study was approved by the Institute’s Ethical Committees of both
Shanghai Mental Health Center and Institute of Psychology,
Chinese Academy of Sciences.
For Experiments 1 and 2, twenty healthy participants (13
females, 24.064.2 years old) were recruited according to following
criteria: 13-term version of Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-13)
#4; Self-rating Anxiety Scale (SAS)#40; 17-term version of
Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HAMD-17)#7; 14-term
version of Hamilton Rating Scale for Anxiety (HAMA-14)#7;
normal or corrected-to-normal vision (tested with international
standard visual testing chart); no history of psychiatric or
neurologic (or medial) disease; and no substance abuse. Both
HAMD-17 and HAMA-14 have Chinese versions with good
reliability and validity [24].
For Experiment 3, twenty-three inpatients with MDD diag-
nosed according to DSM-IV by two professional psychiatrists were
recruited (13 females, 31.869.8 years old). Only subjects with
BDI-13 score.7 and HAMD-17.7 were included. All the
participants were cooperative during the test without severe
suicidal ideation. The average HAMD score was 19.6 (SD=9.3).
MDD patients with severe anxious symptoms (Self-rating Anxiety
Scale (SAS).60, 14-item version of Hamilton Rating Scale for
Anxiety (HAMA-14).29) and/or other neurologic, psychiatric or
medical disorders were excluded from the study. MDD patients
were either medicated or not (serotoninergic drugs; see Table 1 for
details).
In addition, twenty-three healthy control participants (HC, 13
females, 29.8610.1 years old) matched for age and gender with
the MDD patients were recruited according to the criteria in
Experiment 1; this sample of healthy subjects was different from
the one reported in Experiments 1 and 2. Demographic and
clinical data for the MDD (further separated into medicated and
un-medicated) and the HC groups were listed in Table 1 (Part of
the information was obtained after data screening).
Stimuli and Procedure
Stimuli were programmed with the psychophysical toolbox [25–
26] on MATLAB (The MathWorks, Natick, MA), and were
presented on a 17-inch flat-panel monitor. Two square frames
(10.7u610.7u) were displayed side by side on the screen. Through
a mirror stereoscope mounted on a chinrest, each eye of the
participant could only see the frame on the same side, and the
mirror stereoscope was adjusted so that the two frames were
comfortably fused together for the participant. The viewing
distance was 40 cm (see [27] for setup of the equipment).
The general experimental paradigm is shown in Figure 1. There
were two separate sessions for invisible and visible stimuli, each
containing 80 trials. At the beginning of each trial, a fixation cross
(visual angle 0.8u60.8u) was presented to each eye for one second.
The following stimuli lasted for 800 ms in Experiments 1 and 3,
and 200 ms in Experiment 2. The only difference between visible
and invisible sessions was the content of the stimuli: In the invisible
session, a pair of faces with different emotional expressions was
presented to the participant’s non-dominant eye (tested before
experiment), while a pair of identical high contrast dynamic noise
patches was presented to the dominant eye, so that the participant
only perceived the identical noise patches due to the strong
interocular suppression. For the visible session, a pair of faces with
different emotional expressions was presented to both eyes and the
participants could perceive the faces.
Each of the above face pairs was formed by grey-scale images of
a positive and a negative emotional faces (4u66u of visual angle),
which were selected from happiness and sadness categories from
three actors/actresses in Ekman and Friesen’s [28] pictures of
facial affect. The faces were masked using an ellipse so that the
hair and background in the face images were excluded. The noise
patches were masked in the same way to ensure their shape is the
same as the face images. The distance between the centers of the
two faces was around 5u. In half of the trials, the positive
emotional faces were presented to the left, and the negative ones to
the right side. For the other half trials, the positions were reversed.
The above stimuli were followed by a 100-ms fixation cross, and
then identical small Gabor patches (2.5u62.5u) were presented to
both eyes for 100 ms. The positions of the Gabor patches were the
centers of either the left or right previously presented faces. The
Gabor patches were tilted one degree clockwise or counterclock-
wise (randomized), and the participant was instructed to press one
of the two buttons (2-alternative force choice) to indicate their
perception of the orientation of the Gabor patches, regardless of
which side the Gabor patches were presented to. The fixation
would not end until the participants made their choice. Among all
80 trials in each session, the presentation sides of the emotional
faces and that of the Gabor patches were balanced so that there
were 20 trials for each combination. The button-press and
response time (RT) relative to the onset of the Gabor patch
presentations was recorded.
Before the experiment, the participants were familiarized with
the paradigm through a 50-trial training session. To ensure the
participants were never explicitly aware of the invisible faces, they
were instructed to press a different key to reject the trial if they
detected grey-scale images during the invisible session. If more
than two trials were rejected in the invisible session, the data for
the corresponding participant were excluded from further
analyses.
Experiments 1 and 2 were exactly the same except that the
duration of the face presentation was 800 ms in Experiment 1 and
200 ms in Experiment 2. Experiment 3 was the same as
experiment 1 but was applied to different participant populations,
i.e., a new group of HC and a MDD group. For each session, the
participants’ responses were divided into two categories according
to the emotional valence of the faces that were on the same side
with the Gabor patches. The stimuli categories were defined as
positive and negative emotion respectively. For each category,
response accuracy (denoted as Accpos and Accneg) was calculated
Altered Negative Unconscious Processing in MDD
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valid trials. The trials with RT longer than 1500 ms or shorter
than 100 ms were excluded. Within each session, the inter-
category response accuracy difference, dAcc=Accpos2Accneg, was
used as a measure of attention preference. A positive or negative
value indicated attention preference to the positive or negative
emotional faces respectively.
Statistical analysis
In Experiments 1 and 2, the response accuracies for the positive
and negative stimuli were separately tested against zero (using one-
sample t-tests) for both the visible and the invisible conditions. The
attention preference, as measured by dAcc=Accpos2Accneg, was
further tested (using paired t-tests) between the invisible and visible
conditions. In Experiment 3, before the above statistical analyses
were conducted for each participant group, Chi-square tests were
first performed to examine the gender and age difference between
the two groups. After the within-group analyses (as used in
Experiments 1 and 2), we further separated the MDD patients into
medicated and unmedicated groups, and conducted a repeated-
measure two-way ANOVA (visible/invisible6medicated/unmed-
icated) to examine the main effects and interactions between the
two factors. Similarly, we conducted another repeated-measure
two-way ANOVA (visible/invisible6HC/MDD) to examine the
difference between the healthy control and MDD participants.
Results
Experiment 1 (800 ms): Healthy subjects
No participants were excluded according to the criteria
described in Methods. One-sample t-tests showed that the
accuracy difference in the invisible session (dAccinvisible) was
Table 1. Clinical information summary of the participants.
Medicated
*
MDD (n=13)
Unmedicated
MDD (n=8)
pooled MDD
(n=21)
Healthy Control
(n=22)
Age 33.0611.2 29.966.6 31.869.7 30.2610.1
Gender Female 7 4 11 10
Male 6 4 10 12
Mean Illness Duration (Yrs) 4.365.8 2.763.4 3.865.5 -
BDI 19.369.8 19.966.0 19.568.4 1.261.5
SAS 38.769.3 45.469.9 41.269.8 23.763.6
HAMD 19.5611.1 19.865.9 19.669.3 0.361.1
HAMA 14.069.9 19.566.8 16.169.1 0.260.5
*Antidepressants (mg/d): Escitalopram(10); Sertraline(50); Paroxetine(20); Fluvoxamine(50); Fluoxetine(20); Venlafaxine(75); Citalopram(20); Mirtazapine(15); Doxepin
(25); Trazodone (50); John’s Wort Extracts (300).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021881.t001
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the experimental paradigm for the invisible and visible conditions. In the invisible condition,
dynamic noise patches were presented to the dominant eye and faces with happy and sad emotional expressions were presented to the other eye.
The duration of the face presentation was 800 ms for Experiments 1 and 3, and 200 ms for Experiment 2. After a 100-ms interval, participants were
instructed to press one of two buttons as soon and accurate as possible to indicate the perceived orientation (clockwise or counter-clockwise) of a
Gabor patch presented for 100 ms. In the visible condition, the dynamic noise patches were replaced by the same pair of faces presented to the other
eye.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021881.g001
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observers’ attentional preference for negative faces. This contrast-
ed with the accuracy difference in the visible session (dAccvisible)
that was not significantly different from zero [t(19)=.178, p=.867]
thus showing no attentional bias for positive or negative valences.
To further confirm the difference between visible and invisible
sessions, we calculated the dAcc difference between both
conditions and the result was significant [dAccinvisible2dAccvisible,
t(19)=22.595, p=.018] (see Figure 2). The difference is further
demonstrated in the scatter plot of dAccinvisible and dAccvisible for
individual participants (see Figure 3A). In addition, we used a
standard bootstrapping procedure [29–30] to highlight the central
tendency of dAccinvisible and dAccvisible. Specifically, from the
original participants, a bootstrapped sample with the same sample
size (i.e., 20 participants) was nonparametrically resampled with
replacement (i.e., a participant could be selected more than once).
The averaged dAccinvisible and averaged dAccvisible from this
bootstrapped sample was then plotted as a scatter plot (see
Figure 3B). This procedure was repeated for 1000 times, and
histograms representing population means and variations were
generated for the dAccinvisible and dAccvisible respectively. The
histogram of dAccinvisible had a much higher kurtosis than that of
dAccvisible while the mode of the dAccinvisible histogram was clearly
lower than zero (See Figure 3B).
Experiment 2 (200 ms): Healthy subjects
The same group of participants in Experiment 1 also participated
in Experiment 2 which differed only in the presentation duration of
the stimulus (200 ms instead of 800 ms). This experiment was
undertaken to further examine whether the stimulus presentation
duration modulates the unconscious effects observed in the invisible
condition in Experiment 1. The dAccinvisible was not significantly
different from zero [t(19)=2.442, p=.663] while the dAccvisible was
significantly higher than zero [t(19)=2.519, p=.021]. Hence, the
shorter presentation time blurs the attentional preference to
negative emotions in the unconscious mode while it yields a positive
bias in the conscious mode (See Figure 2, 200 ms group). However,
the difference between the invisible and visible sessions failed to
achieve significance [dAccinvisible2dAccvisible, t(19)=21.633,
p=.119] (See Figure 2, 200 ms group).
Experiment 3 (800 ms): Healthy and MDD subjects
Due to low response accuracy (lower than chance level), two
MDD patients had to be excluded. In the HC group, one
participant was excluded due to too few valid trials caused by
abnormal response time. The age and gender ratio was matched
between the two groups [age: t(41)=.524, p=.603, gender ratio:
x
2(1)=.020, p=.887]. The detailed demographic and clinical data
are presented in Table 1.
A repeated-measure two-way ANOVA was performed to
examine the difference between medicated and unmedicated
MDD subjects in the dAcc in both experimental conditions, visible
and invisible; this yielded no significant statistics in either main
effects or interactions between medication groups and the
experimental conditions [F(1, 19)=.17, p=.684 for main effect of
the experimental conditions, F(1, 19)=.325, p=.575 for experi-
mental condition6medication group interaction]. This indicated
the medication did not play an important role in the results, and
therefore the two MDD groups were merged for further analyses.
The dAcc difference between the MDD and HC groups across
two experimental conditions (visible and invisible) was examined
by a repeated-measure two-way ANOVA. The results showed a
significant interaction effect between the experimental conditions
and the subject groups [F(1, 41)=4.537, p=.039].
Further simple effect analysis showed significant dAcc difference
between MDD and HC groups in the invisible condition [F(1,
41)=7.900, p=.008, see Figure 4]. The dAccinvisible for the MDD
group was not significantly different from zero [t(20)=2.153,
p=.880], indicating that there was no bias between positive and
negative valences in MDD patients in the invisible condition. In
contrast, the dAccinvisible for the HC group was significantly
negative [t(21)=24.296, p=.000], which was consistent with the
findings in Experiment 1.
In the visible condition, however, there was no significant
dAccvisible difference between HC and MDD groups [F(1,
14)=.030, p=.874, see Figure 4]. Specifically, the dAccvisible for
the MDD groups was not significantly different from zero
[t(20)=24.296, p=.864], and so was the dAccvisible for the HC
groups [t(21)=.507, p=.618].
Similarly, we presented scatter plots for individual participants
as in Experiment 1 to demonstrate that the difference between the
MDD and HC groups in the invisible condition was more robust
than in the visible condition (see Figure 5A). To highlight the inter-
group difference on dAccinvisible, bootstrap resampling procedures
similar to that used in Experiment 1 were conducted within each
of the groups (see Figure 5B). The histograms representing
population means and variations showed significant difference
between the two groups in the invisible condition but not in the
visible condition.
Discussion
This study investigated unconscious positive and negative
emotion processing in both clinical MDD patients and healthy
controls. The main findings are: 1) Healthy subjects preferred to
attend to positive emotional-valence stimuli in the visible, i.e.,
conscious condition, while negative valences significantly attracted
more attention in the invisible, i.e., unconscious condition; and 2)
the unconscious attention preference to negative emotional
valences remained absent in MDD patients which allowed to
clearly distinguish them from the healthy group.
Figure 2. Comparison on attention preference in different
sessions for healthy controls. The attention preference was indexed
by difference in performance accuracy of the Gabor patch orientation
judgment task. A positive value indicates attention preference to happy
faces, and a negative value indicates attention preference to sad faces.
In the 800-ms session, the invisible condition revealed significantly
negative attention preference while the visible condition did not show
significant valence preference. In the 200-ms session, no significant
valence preference was observed in the invisible condition; the visible
condition showed a positive trend though.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021881.g002
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healthy subjects
Healthy subjects showed attention preference to sad facial
expression in the unconscious condition (Experiment 1). This is in
accordance with various studies showing that emotional contents
as distinguished from non-emotional ones are preferentially
processed in unconscious condition. For example, Dimberg et al.
[31] found that both positive and negative emotional reactions can
be unconsciously evoked (also [32]); Jiang and He [33] showed
that amygdala activity could be induced by fearful but not neutral
facial expressions during unconscious presentation. What remains
unclear though is whether this preference for emotions in the
unconscious mode is valence-specific, meaning whether it pertains
specifically for negative or positive emotions.
Our findings in healthy subjects demonstrated that processing in
especially the unconscious mode is valence-specific by showing the
specific impact of negative emotions. However, such preference for
negative emotions was not observed in the conscious mode where
the opposite valence, positive emotions, dominated. This raises the
question for possible mechanisms of this preference for negative
emotions in the unconscious mode. One may assume that negative
emotions are processed with stronger and possibly also faster than
positive emotions in the unconscious mode. This may also be
neurobiologically plausible given that unconscious processing of
negative emotions has been specifically associated with direct fast
subcortical pathways from the visual cortex to the amygdala (see
[34,35] for a review). In contrast, conscious processing has been
related to relatively slower connections from the amygdala to the
prefrontal cortex (for a review, see [5]) (see Figure 6a). However,
this assumption remains speculative at this point awaiting further
supporting evidence from future functional imaging studies.
In contrast to the preference for negative emotions in the
unconscious mode, we observed a preference for positive emotions
in the conscious mode in Experiment 2. This is well in accordance
with previous studies that also observed a similar positive attention
bias in the conscious condition in healthy participants [36–39].
It should be noted though that we obtained such positive
preference only in our Experiment 2 whereas it was not observed
in Experiment 1. We suspected that this was due to the 800-ms cue
Figure 3. Individual attention preference of healthy participants in the invisible and visible conditions. (A) Scatter plot of individual
attention preference across the invisible and the visible conditions. Each dot represents the attention preference for a participant. The locationso f
the dots are determined by the visible (horizontal axis) and the invisible (vertical axis) conditions. The zero levels that indicate no attention preference
are illustrated using dotted-lines. Except two participants, all others show a negative attention preference in the invisible condition, but no such trend
appears in the visible conditions. (B) Scatter plot of bootstrapped sample means of the attention preference. 1000 datasets are resampled from the
original participants, each containing 20 participants, and the mean attention preference metrics for both invisible (horizontal axis) and visible
conditions (vertical axis) for each resampled dataset are represented by a point on the scatter plot. The locations of the points are separately
projected to the horizontal and the vertical axes, and the histograms are used to represent the distribution of the projected locations for the visible
and the invisible conditions respectively. In the invisible condition, the distribution is below the zero level and has a relatively small deviation,
indicating a robust negative bias in population level, while the distribution for the visible condition is centered at the zero.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021881.g003
Figure 4. Comparisons of attention preference between
healthy controls and MDD patients. In the invisible condition,
the healthy controls showed significantly negative attention preference,
but the MDD patients did not. The difference between the two groups
was significant. In the visible condition, the two groups behaved
similarly.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021881.g004
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[18,27]. Due to this rather long duration, participants may have
directed their attention away from the stimuli in the conscious
condition thereby preventing the positive emotions form exerting
their full effect. In order to avoid this problem, we reduced the
exposure duration to 200 ms in Experiment 2. As a result, the
positive bias in the visible condition was observed as expected,
which though impact the unconscious condition and its preference
for negative emotions in a negative way. Though seemingly a
merely methodological problem, the impact of the duration time
on the interaction with positive and negative emotions in both
unconscious and conscious modes may point to an underlying
neurophysiological mechanism. More specifically, our results
suggest that the temporal duration of the stimulus may be central
for inducing the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the
valence-specific effects in both unconscious and conscious modes.
This remains to be investigated in the future.
Disturbed negative emotional unconscious processing in
depressed patients
In contrast to the healthy subjects, MDD patients did not show
any preference towards negative emotions in the invisible
condition, i.e., the unconscious mode. Hence, their automatic
and implicit negative emotional processing seems to be diminished
in the unconscious mode. This complements and extends the
many findings showing a negative bias in conscious emotion
processing in for instance emotion regulation and attention tasks
[40–42]. Taken together, these findings support the proposed
hypothesis that depressed individuals may not automatically (and
thus unconsciously) orient their attention towards negative
information in the environment, but once such information has
come to be the focus of their attention, they may have greater
difficulty disengaging from it [5].
Our results may also be clinically relevant in that unconscious
negative emotional processing may provide a novel and more
viable target for future psychotherapeutic and/or pharmacother-
apeutic intervention than conscious emotion regulation strategies.
More specifically, it means that we have to target unconscious
processing rather than conscious processing as targeted in
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy. Hence, our hypothesis, if con-
firmed in the future, may stipulate the development of more
specific psychotherapeutic strategies.
The same obviously holds for pharmacotherapeutic strategies.
As discussed above, unconscious processing is mediated predom-
inantly by fast processing in subcortical systems, while conscious
processing is rather related to slower processing in cortical regions.
Interestingly, depressed patients indeed show major resting state
abnormalities in these subcortical regions ranging from the brain
stem (raphe nucleus, locus coerulus) to the dorsomedial thalamus,
the PAG, the tectum, the colliculi, and the amygdala (and
ultimately to the cortex [6,9–11,17,43–45]).
How are the resting state abnormalities in these regions related
to the observed deficits in unconscious negative emotional
processing? The abnormally high resting state activity [46] may
Figure 5. Individual attention preference of healthy controls and MDD patients. (A) Scatter plot of attention preference of MDD patients
(blue points) and healthy controls (red points) across the visible (horizontal axis) and the invisible (vertical axis) conditions. The horizontal and vertical
dash lines represent the no-preference level for the visible and invisible conditions respectively. Most healthy controls showed negative attention
preference in the invisible condition (most red points are below horizontal dash line), but there was no such trend in MDD patients (the blue points
show no obvious trend relative to the horizontal dash line). (B) Scatter plot of bootstrapped sample means of the two groups. For each participant
group, 1000 datasets (with the same number of participants of the original group) are resampled from the original participants, and the mean
attention preference metrics for both invisible and visible conditions for each dataset are represented by locations of the points on the scatter plot.
The locations are projected to horizontal and vertical axes, based on which the distributions of attention preference metrics for the visible and
invisible conditions are generated. The distribution for the MDD patients (blue histograms) and the healthy controls (red histograms) are clearly
separated in the invisible condition but mixed together in the visible condition, showing a good separation between the two participant groups in
the invisible paradigm.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021881.g005
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processing of emotional stimuli while it may exert less impact on
the slower conscious processing. One would hence assume
abnormally decreased rest-stimulus interaction [47] in subcortical
midline regions in MDD during especially negative emotional
processing. Such decreased rest-stimulus interaction may then be
manifested in decreased preference for negative emotions in the
unconscious mode and that is exactly what we observed in our
current study. Based on our findings, one may envision the
developments of pharamcotherapeutic strategies (and other
therapeutic tools like deep brain stimulation) that specifically
target the subcortical fast tracks and their rest-stimulus interac-
tion rather than the cortical slow connections. This however
remains a scenario for the future.
How the deficits in unconscious negative processing are related
to the conscious processing of emotions? Depressed patients show
a deficit in unconscious emotion processing which may let them
puzzled about the relevance and significance of negative emotions;
this in turn may induce the often described emotion regulation
deficits and the abnormal attention bias towards negative emotions
in the conscious mode (see Figure 6b).
In conclusion, we here demonstrate for the first time negative
valence-specific effects in unconscious emotion processing in
healthy subjects and their disruption in MDD patients. This
yields not only novel insights into unconscious processing in
general but suggests also that the often observed negative bias in
the conscious mode in MDD may result from a deficit in
unconscious negative processing.
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Figure 6. Conceptual schema combining the implications of the current findings into a general framework. As proposed by numerical
studies, the emotional stimuli are processed through three general phases, including analysis of stimulus features, recognition and response to
emotion, and emotion regulation. The processing can be separated into conscious and unconscious parts. (A) Framework for healthy participants.
Studies on conscious emotion processing have suggested a positive preference in healthy subjects [39], we therefore mark the positive processing in
conscious processing using a bold arrow and the negative processing using a narrow arrow. Our findings indicate that in the unconscious processing
stage, the negative emotions may be processed through a stronger and faster pathway, as indicated by the bold arrow. (B) Framework for MDD
patients. Our findings also suggest that MDD patients may have a deficit in unconscious negative emotion processing (see the thinner arrow for
negative emotion in the unconscious part). This, in turn, may affect the conscious processing which then becomes shifted from positive to negative
emotion preference (see the bolder arrow for negative emotion in the conscious part) in order to compensate the hitherto incomplete processing of
negative emotions in the deficient unconscious mode.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021881.g006
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